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OBLIGATIONS OF THE PURCHASING
EMPLOYER ON A PRE-EXISTING
LABOR CONTRACT
An entity that purchases a business in which a labor union has
been certified or which is bound by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, faces three basic problems: (1) Must it bargain with the
union? (2) Is it in any way bound by the pre-existing agreement
between the seller and the union? (3) Is it bound to remedy unfair
labor practices of the seller? This article examines the nature of
these problems and the current state of the law as established by de-
cisions of the courts and the National Labor Relations Board.
BARGAIN WITH THE UNION?
The NLRB grants a certification to a union if a majority of
the employees to be represented vote for the union. The United States
Supreme Court has held that the certification requires the employer
to bargain with the union for at least one year.' Subsequent deci-
sions have enforced the one-year requirement absent unusual cir-
cumstances.' Will a change in employers by virtue of a sale of the
business be considered an unusual circumstance so that the pur-
chasing employer may avoid the bargaining requirement? It has
been held that unusual circumstances may exist where there is a
substantial change in business operations or personnel but that a
change in employers alone does not permit the new employer to
avoid the bargaining requirement.' Even after the initial certifica-
tion year, there is a rebuttable presumption that a majority of the
employees still want the union representation and that therefore,
the employer, including a purchasing employer, must recognize and
bargain with the union.' In rebutting the presumption, a purchaser
must exhibit good faith where he contends that the employees no
longer wish union representation.' In one case, where the certification
was 18 years old, factors which were held sufficient to rebut the pre-
I Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1955).
2 Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437 (1963); Colony Materials, Inc.,
130 N.L.R.B. 105 (1960); Firchau Loggin Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960).
3 See NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Service, Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959),
where the court refused to enforce an order by the Board compelling the purchaser
to bargain with the union certified to represent the seller's employees, even though
it was within the certification year. The basis for the decision was that there had
been a substantial change in the nature of the employing enterprise.
4 Richard W. Kaase Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 245 (1963); Downtown Bakery Corp.,
139 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1962).
5 Diamond National Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 268 (1961).
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sumption were the change in ownership, management, operations,
a marked reduction in number of employees, and the fact that the
purchasing employer was willing to bargain.' Similarly, substantial
indications of employee dissatisfaction with union representation in
combination with an apparent lack of union animosity by the
purchasing employer has also been found sufficient to rebut the
presumption.7 Therefore, if there is substantial doubt as to the
union's status, the result is a requirement for a reshowing of that
status, by vote of the employees, before the purchasing employer is
obligated to recognize and bargain with the union.
BOUND BY PRE-EXISTING CONTRACT?
Until 1964, the general rule was that the purchasing employer
was not bound by the labor contract provisions of the selling em-
ployer, absent an express assumption of the contract.8 In 1964, the
United States Supreme Court changed this rule. Interscience Pub-
lishers, Inc., which had a labor contract running until January 31,
1962, merged with Wiley on October 2, 1961, and ceased to do busi-
ness as a separate entity. Most of the Interscience employees were
absorbed by Wiley. The contract had no provision making it binding
on successors. Wiley expressly disclaimed any obligation under the
contract and, in fact, claimed that the merger terminated the union's
status as bargaining agent for all purposes. The union asserted that
it continued to have bargaining rights for the former Interscience
employees. It demanded that Wiley submit certain disputes to arbi-
tration in accordance with the arbitration provisions of the agree-
ment the union had with Interscience. Arbitration was ordered 0 and
Wiley appealed.
The Supreme Court, after expressing the principle that the
national labor policy favored arbitration of disputes, held that:
... [T]he disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which
has entered into a collective bargaining agreement . . . does not auto-
matically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agree-
ment, and ... in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor
employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the
agreement."
B Id. at 270.
7 Mitchell Standard Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 496 (1963).
8 Empire Workers v. Empire Co., 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1946); Herman Loewenstein,
Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 47 (1947); Jolly Giant Lumber Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 413 (1955);
General Extrusion Company, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1958) ; American Concrete Pipe
of Hawaii, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 720 (1960); Rohlik Inc., 55 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1964). In
some of these cases, the purchasing employer was considered to be the successor to
the seller and in all of them there was a substantial continuity of operations.
9 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
10 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963).
11 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
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It explained that although the principles of law governing ordinary
contracts would not bind a nonconsenting successor, ". .. a collective
bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract."' 2 The holding
did state that the duty to arbitrate would not bind all purchasing
employers and gave as a possible basis for an exemption:
... [T] he lack of any substantial continuity of identity in the busi-
ness enterprise before and after a change [which] would make a duty to
arbitrate something imposed from -without, not reasonably to be found
in the particular bargaining agreement and the acts of the parties
involved.' 3
Prior to the decision in Wiley, the ninth circuit in Wackenhut
v. Plant Guards,'4 held that a purchaser was not bound to honor the
arbitration provision of a contract between the seller and union
where (1) there had been no agreement to assume the contract, (2)
there was no merger, (3) the purchaser was not the mere alter ego
of the seller, and (4) the sale was not to avoid the contract. After
the Supreme Court's decision, Wackenhut was reheard 5 and the
court ordered the purchaser to arbitrate because there was a sub-
stantial similarity of operation and a continuity of identity of the
enterprise after the sale, which, it said, Wiley made the basis for re-
quiring arbitration. The court held Wiley controlling even though it
was not able to classify the purchaser as an alter ego or as a "suc-
cessor," or to classify the transaction as a merger.
The third circuit, relying on Wiley, ruled in Steelworkers v.
Reliance Universal' that the purchaser must submit to the arbitra-
tion provision of the seller's labor contract. It seemed to extend
Wiley in holding that the pre-existing contract remained "the basic
charter of labor relations"' 7 between the union and purchaser, a
point on which the Supreme Court had declined to comment. The
court also said that the ". . . arbitrators may properly give weight
to any change of circumstances created by the transfer of ownership
which may make adherence to any term or terms of that agreement
inequitable."'
It now seems clear that even though the purchaser expressly
disclaims assumption of the labor contract, and even though the pre-
existing contract does not by its terms bind successors, the purchaser
will be held at least to its arbitration provisions if there is substan-
tial continuity of identity in the enterprise after the sale. Thus,
12 Id. at 550.
.1 Id. at 551.
14 Wackenhut v. Plant Guards, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
15 Wackenhut v. Plant Guards, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964), rehearing.
16 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964).
17 Id. at 895.
18 Ibid.
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whether or not the purchaser is a legal successor, i.e., a purchaser
of assets and liabilities, is not a criterion. Further, even though the
Wiley case involved a merger, that fact alone was not the basis for
the liability of the purchaser. The controlling factor was the con-
tinuity of the enterprise. The Wackenhut and Reliance cases force-
fully clarify these points since neither involved a merger and neither
purchaser was a legal successor. Furthermore, Reliance indicates
that courts may be willing to allow the purchaser to be bound by pro-
visions of the contract beyond the arbitration clause with its holding
that the entire pre-existing contract would remain "the basic charter
of labor relations."
REMEDY UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES?
When employers are found guilty of committing an unfair labor
practice, the NLRB issues an order stating the remedial action to
be taken. Will the order be automatically enforceable against a suc-
cessor? The United States Supreme Court held in Regal Knitwear
Co. v. NLRB' 9 that an enforcement order may not be "so broad
as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently
and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law.""0 The
Courts said it was the actual relationship which existed between the
employer covered by the order and the "successor," not the term it-
self, which governed. Thus, if the successor was an aider or abettor
in the commission of the practice, or was "merely a disguised con-
tinuance of the old employer,"'" it would be bound.
Despite the Supreme Court holding, the NLRB ruled in Alex-
ander Milburn Co.22 that a purchaser who had taken over the entire
business, and who had knowledge of the commission of an unfair
labor practice, was bound to remedy the practice under an order
issued to the seller. The decision was based on the continuity of em-
ployment and operations, not on alter ego or participation in the
unfair labor practice.
Continuity of operations and personnel continued as the Board
doctrine until the tenth circuit in NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale
19 324 U.S. 9 (1944).
20 Id. at 13. It was pointed out that Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provided that: "Every order granting an injunction and every restraining
order ... is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, ser-
vants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or partid-
pation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or
otherwise," and that "the term 'successors' in an enforcement order may not enlarge
its scope beyond that defined by the Rule."
21 Id. at 14.
22 Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1948).
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Motor Co. 3 specifically applied the Regal Knitwear Co. criteria and
held that a good-faith purchaser, although a successor in terms of
continuity of operations and personnel, was not bound by an order
issued to the seller. The decision was enough to compel the Board
to overrule its Milburn doctrine.2 4
The fifth circuit has held an order was enforceable against a
purchaser in a bona fide transaction where the business remained
substantially the same.2" No reference was made to Rule 65(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court did not go to
the extent of labeling the purchaser the alter ego of the seller.
Knowledge of the unfair labor practice was probably present, al-
though the subject was not treated specifically in the decision.
In C. T. Reynolds Box Co.,26 the Board upheld the trial ex-
aminer's finding that there was substantially .the same ownership
and a continuity of operations after the sale, so that the purchaser
who knew of the unfair practice was bound: "Whether the term 'suc-
cessor' or 'alter ego' is applied to the relationship, the corpora-
tion was not a bona fide successor insofar as unfair labor practices are
involved. '2 7 There was substantial evidence that the seller was trying
to evade its duty to bargain with the union by selling the business to
a corporation which had the same ownership as itself. Although the
Board did not cite Birdsall-Stockdale, its reference to the purchaser
as not being in good faith suggests it had that decision in mind.
In the most recent reported case heard by the NLRB on this
subject,"8 the purchaser was held not bound to remedy unfair labor
practices, even though the owner of the selling business was a di-
rector, officer and substantial stockholder in the purchasing corpora-
tion. The specific basis for the ruling of non-liability was the pur-
chaser's lack of knowledge of the unfair labor practice.
It is difficult to draw definite conclusions from the Board and
Court rulings. It is clear that orders to remedy unfair practices
are enforceable against the alter ego of the selling corporation. On
the other hand, the Board will not hold liable the purchaser who had
no knowledge of the unfair labor practice and is not in any way a
collaborator with the seller. Not so clear is the status of the non-
collaborating purchaser who may have knowledge of the unfair
labor practice and who continues substantially the same operations.
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28 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953).
24 Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1953).
25 NLRB v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co., 285 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960).
26 139 N.L.R.B. 519 (1962).
27 Id. at 524.
28 M. Yoseph Bag Company, 1962 CCH NLRB 1 11,805.
